我国国企MBO制度缺陷与对策研究
江泽利
摘 要
MBO是英文Management Buy-out的缩写,中文通常被译作“管理层”收购,是指公司的管理层利用借贷所融资本或股权交易收购本公司股权,以改变公司的所有者结构、资产结构和控制权结构,使企业原经营者成为企业所有者的一种行为。
我国自引进MBO制度以来,对国有企业,尤其是对我国中小型国有企业,通过管理层收购实施了国有股产权改革,取得了较好的成效。但同时也暴露了许多产权改革过程中的不良现象,如,违规融资、不公开定价、“自卖自买”等交易,造成国有资产严重流失,引起了社会公众的普遍关注,也招致社会各界的议论和不满。
这些不满和议论随着“郎顾之争”的升温而被推向了高潮,成为继1994年“国企改革大讨论”之后的又一次“产权改革大讨论”,且迅速席卷全国。
讨论的中心议题是MBO是否还应该在中国继续被实施。 MBO过程中是否真的存在“国有资产流失”现象,政府是否应该停止国有企业MBO,诸如此类的问题也引起了政府的关注与重视。对此,国资委主任李荣融在2004年10月底的一次新闻发布会上发言时承认,“当前国有资产流失问题集中在MBO,而MBO收购过程中的主要问题就是自卖自买”。2004年12月12日,时任国务院副总理的黄菊同志,又在出席2004年度中央企业负责人年终总结大会时指出:“大型企业不准搞管理层收购,中小企业的管理层收购也要区别情况,要规范。对于管理层收购,国资委要制定发布专门文件,做到有章可循。”
政府代表的发言表明,一,对我国国有企业MBO的功过是非予以了客观评价。为回应民众要求制止民脂民膏不被侵吞的强烈呼声,对发生在国有企业MBO过程的非正常现象予以承认。二,国有企业中还将继续实施MBO。我国国有资产改革的大方向不会变,MBO作为国有企业实现国有股减持的有效措施仍将被继续。三,我国国有企业MBO过程中存在着的这样或那样的一些不尽人意问题,是可以通过制度完善,规范操作来加以避免的。
政府对规范MBO行为有信心,我也一样希望对MBO制度缺陷与对策进行研究分析的,探索一套可行的制度,以保证MBO健康进行。本文通过引用西方经济学理论,如激励机制、产权理论、新制度经济学、产业经济学、产业结构理论、博弈论、制度供给理论及信息经济学等,对我国国有企业MBO制度及制度实施现状进行了全面分析研究,并适度采用了对比法,对中外MBO制度理论进行对比分析。全文共分为三个部分:
第一部分为第1章,是论文基础部分。在这一部分,作者通过对MBO的起源及基本概念的界定,提出了自己的初步观点,即,MBO是“管理者收购”,而非“管理层收购”,充实了长期以来指导我国MBO实践的理论。
第二部分包括第2、3两章,是论文实证分析部分,也是理论联系实际的重要部分。在这一部分,作者从我国国有企业MBO的历史出发,客观评述了MBO对我国国有企业产权改革的重要作用,也揭示了MBO实践中存在的一些问题;接着,作者又从我国现行有关MBO制度入手,阐明了我国现行MBO制度的现状及存在的缺陷和不足,为对策研究提供了充分的事实依据。
第三部分为第4章,是对策和建议部分。这一部分在前面两部分基础之上,从理论创新、制度完善、监督控制等几个方面,对避免和防止MBO实施过程中“国有资产流失”现象,提出了一整套建设性建议和应对措施。对我国国有企业MBO目标及实施措施提出了新的要求,也是对前两部分研究的综合与提升,是本文研究的落脚点,充分体现了本文研究的理论和实践意义。
关键词: 国有企业 MBO 制度缺陷 对策
Abstract
MBO is an abbreviation of Management Buy-out in English. In Chinese, the abbreviation is usually translated to purchase of "the management "that is refers to the management as one level of the company, for change the owner structure, the property structure and the domination structure of the company, use to lend money to purchases the stock of this company, causes the enterprise original operator to become the enterprise owner's one kind of behavior.
Since our country has been introduced, the MBO system, as an implement of the property reform, to the state-owned enterprise, especially to our middle and small scale state-owned enterprise, which has achieved a good result.
But simultaneously, it also has exposed some undesirable phenomena in process of the property reforms, such as illegal financing, pricing is not open, "traders from buying", and other transactions, resulting in serious loss of state assets, has not only aroused the universal concern of the public but also lead to the community to debate and discontent.
Whit “the dispute of Lang with Gu” was heat up, these dissatisfaction and the discussion is pushed to the high tide, became "the property right to reform the big discussion" which is continues "the state-owned enterprise to reform the big discussion" in 1994, and rapidly sweep all over our country.
In this discussion, it is central that MBO whether also should continue in China. In the MBO process whether the real existence the phenomenon about "the state asset does drain", whether the government should stop state-owned enterprise MBO, the so forth question was repeatedly asked by the public that has aroused government department's interest and takes.
At end of October of 2004, arm at the Public matter of concern proposed which on the discussion process in, Li RongRong as director of State Asset Management Committee, make the speech at a press conference, said, "the question, the current state asset drains, to concentrate in MBO, but the main question, in the MBO process, is from sells buys".
On December 12th, 2004, Huang Ju ,as Vice-Premier of our State, in attends annual's end congress of 2004 year, pointed out, "The major industry does not permit to do MBO, in mid- and small-scale enterprise, the MBO also must distinguish the situation, wants the standard. Regarding the MBO, the State Asset Management Committee must formulate the issue special document, achieves has a legal basis."
In my opinion, the government representative's speech has indicated three meanings. Firstly, it is an evaluation to the operation of our state-owned enterprise by MBO. In order to respond the populace request to stop the action of embezzles which likes flesh and blood of the people, the government acknowledged that it is an unusual phenomenon that above mention phenomena in the MBO of state-owned enterprise process. Secondly, it is an attitude of our government on the question whether continues in the state-owned enterprise to implement MBO. The general orientation of our state asset reform have never been change, MBO, as one effective action to took the state-owned share reduction, will to be continue. Thirdly, these phenomena in our country state-owned enterprise MBO process is may be perfect through set up the standard operates performs and repaid the system to avoid.
Government acts to regulate MBO confidence, as I also hope that the MBO system defects and countermeasures research and analysis, to explore a workable system to ensure that the MBO health. By reference western economic theory, such as the incentive mechanism, and property rights theory, New institution Economics(NIE), industrial economics, and the industrial structure theory, game theory and information theory, and so on, I conducted a comprehensive analysis for China's state-owned enterprises MBO system and the status of implementation of the system, and appropriate use of the comparative method with the foreign MBO system theory. This thesis is divided into three parts:
Part I is chapter 1 is the basis of the thesis. In this section, the author through the MBO and the origin of the definition of basis concepts, raised individual preliminary view that, MBO is one kind of behavior about purchase by manager who is personal rather than by manager who are one collectivity, and enrich the guidance of China's MBO has a theory of practice.
Part II includes chapters 2 and 3, this section is an important part in the paper with empirical Analysis of linking theory with reality. In this section, the author objective review of the MBO as property rights reform of China abut state-owned enterprises from the history of MBO in china, and revealed the existence of the practice of some problems. Author has start study from China's current system of MBO, elaborated China's current MBO system and the status of the existing defects and shortcomings. This part is measures to provide sufficient factual basis for countermeasures study.
Part III be refers to Chapter 4 which is recommendations and responses for above write. Basis of the front part of this thesis, the author put forward a set of constructive proposals and responding to the program, for avoid and prevent the "loss of state assets" phenomenon, a set of constructive proposals and response measures, from the theoretical innovation, and the system improve, supervision and control etc several aspects.
These suggests put forward new requirements for target of reform in China's state-owned enterprises and standard of implementation. This is the end-result of this study and is consolidated and upgrading for parts I and II on this thesis which fully embodies the theoretical and practical significance.
Keyword: State-Owned Enterprises of China/ MBO/ System Shortcoming /Countermeasure
目 录
论文摘要
第1章 绪 论 1
1.1 选题背景 1
1.1.1 问题的提出 1
1.1.2 研究的现实意义 2
1.2 MBO起源与概念界定 3
1.2.1 MBO的起源 3
1.2.2 MBO的概念 5
中国人民银行、国家外汇管理局关于加强境内金融机构外汇担保项下人民币贷款业务管理的通知
中国人民银行 国家外汇管理局
中国人民银行、国家外汇管理局关于加强境内金融机构外汇担保项下人民币贷款业务管理的通知
中国人民银行 国家外汇管理局
中国人民银行各省、自治区、直辖市分行,深圳经济特区分行;国家外汇管理局各省、自治区、直辖市分局,深圳分局;各中资外汇指定银行,全国性信托投资公司,全国性租赁公司,总行直接监管的财务公司:
近期以来,境内机构(包括中资机构和外商投资企业)利用外汇质押及外资银行提供外汇担保而获得境内中资银行人民币贷款的现象逐渐增多,用途混乱。为加强风险管理,规范中资银行的业务做法,现将有关规定通知如下:
一、对境内机构外币存款帐户实行帐户管理,金融机构不再给存款单位开具存单,改为出具“境内机构外币定期存款开户证实书”,其格式参考人民币“境内机构定期存款开户证实书”。
二、境内中资外汇指定银行向境内中资机构提供人民币贷款时,不得接受外资银行和境外机构提供的各种外汇担保(含备用信用证),也不得接受“境内机构定期存款开户证实书”及外汇本票、汇票、支票、债券、股票等作为人民币贷款的质押凭证。
三、境内中资外汇指定银行向外商投资企业发放外汇质押和外资银行外汇担保项下人民币贷款时,按以下规定办理:
1、从事上述担保项下人民币贷款业务的仅限于境内中资外汇指定银行总行或其授权的分行。
2、外商投资企业所质押外汇仅限于外债项下外汇收入。申请外汇质押的外商投资企业,其注册资本金须足额到位,并向境内中资外汇指定银行出具注册会计师的验资证明;在中资外汇指定银行提供人民币贷款期间,外商投资企业不得抽走资本金。
3、出具外汇担保的机构原则上仅限于境内外资银行,如为境外外资银行,则必须是获得国际权威评级机构穆迪或标准普尔A1或A+以上信用评级的银行,担保形式为备用信用证或无条件、不可转让的保函。
4、担保项下人民币贷款只能用于补充企业流动资金不足,不得用于弥补长期项目投资缺口,不得用于购汇进口和还贷。流动资金贷款期限不得超过相应外汇担保期限,并不得在担保相应展期且生效的前提下将流动资金贷款展期。
5、中资外汇指定银行对上述贷款资金使用实行专户管理,严格监督资金用途与安全。
6、外商投资企业以外债项下外汇收入质押,获得境内中资外汇指定银行人民币贷款时,须于签订贷款合同后15日内到所在地外汇局办理外汇质押登记手续。境内中资外汇指定银行收回人民币贷款之前,外商投资企业不得动用所质押外汇。外商投资企业外汇质押项下人民币贷款合同
执行完毕,其所质押外汇必须划转原帐户;外商投资企业外汇质押需履约时,其外汇资金必须结汇,结汇手续由外商投资企业报所在地外汇局核准。
7、外商投资企业接受外资银行外汇担保,须到所在地外汇局办理或有负债登记手续。外资银行外汇担保履约时,其外汇资金必须结汇,结汇手续由境内中资外汇指定银行报外汇局核准;外商投资企业须到外汇局办理或有负债注销手续,同时办理相应的外债登记手续;外商投资企业对
外偿债须按规定经所在地外汇局核准。
8、各中资外汇指定银行总行须制定规范的贷款和担保合同框架文本及对重要条款拟接受和争取的谈判口径与原则,并于1998年10月31日前报中国人民银行和国家外汇管理局备案。
9、1998年10月1日前发生、迄今仍有效的外汇担保项下人民币贷款,有关银行应督促外商投资企业于1998年10月31日前按上述规定到外汇局补办登记手续。
10、外汇局省级分局须于每月8日前将辖区内外汇质押项下和外资银行外汇担保项下人民币贷款情况报国家外汇管理局。
四、经批准经营外汇业务的境内中资外汇指定银行所叙做的正常的外汇结算进出口押汇业务或打包放款等贸易融资业务,不适用本通知,但须严格按有关规定办理,并尽快建立企业统一授信制度,控制风险。
五、本通知自1998年10月1日起实行,以前文件与本通知有冲突的,以本通知为准。请各外汇管理分局接此通知后速转发辖内各外资银行执行。
1998年9月26日